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Abstract
Improving retailers’ incentives for service is a prominent eﬃciency defense for resale
price maintenance (RPM). We investigate the incentives of symmetric manufacturers
to use RPM when selling products through common retailers who provide services such
as pre-sale advice. We show that the possibility to use minimum RPM can create a
dilemma for manufacturers when retailers inﬂuence consumer choice through service. If
price competition among retailers is strong, a manufacturer beneﬁts from introducing
minimum RPM as it incentivizes retailers to favor the sales of her product. How-
ever, other manufacturers follow into RPM. In the symmetric equilibrium, service is
unbiased, but retail margins and consumer prices are higher than without RPM. In
turn, manufacturers’ proﬁts and social welfare are lower. This challenges the service
argument as an eﬃciency defense for RPM.
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11 Introduction
The US Supreme Court overturned the long-standing per se illegality of minimum resale
price maintenance (RPM)1 with the Leegin decision of 2007.2 A controversial debate has
accompanied this decision. The European Commission ﬁnally decided to maintain minimum
and ﬁxed RPM as a core restriction of competition in the renewed vertical block exemption of
2010,3 but it has modiﬁed its vertical guidelines by speciﬁcally characterizing circumstances
under which minimum RPM may be legal.4 There is wide consensus both in competition
policy and economics that RPM can be harmful by facilitating collusion among manufacturers
(Telser, 1960; Motta, 2004; Jullien & Rey, 2007), or at least dampening competition (Rey &
Vergé, 2007, Rey & Vergé, 2010). RPM is also considered harmful as a means to facilitate
retailing collusion (Marvel & McCaﬀerty, 1984) and as an exclusionary device (Asker &
Bar-Isaac, 2011).5
The dominant eﬃciency defense both in Leegin and the European guidelines is that a
manufacturer can use minimum RPM to provide retailers with appropriate incentives for
service. Most prominent is retailers’ free-riding on services that may yield insuﬃcient service
under price competition.6
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in the Leegin decision that manufacturers’ and consumers’
interests with respect to retail margins are generally aligned is based on Mathewson and
Winter (1998).7 Remarkably, the latter discuss the established service arguments in the
context of a single manufacturer and exclusive retailers.
The underlying rationale of these service arguments is that in vertical structures with
decentralized decision making, individuals do not necessarily make decisions that maximize
joint proﬁts. Consider that a retailer’s service increases the demand for a product which in
turn also beneﬁts the manufacturer. This positive vertical externality can yield too little ser-
vice (Winter, 1993; Schulz, 2007). Horizontally, free-riding may arise if retailers beneﬁt from
each other’s services (Telser, 1960). A single manufacturer can mitigate these coordination
failures by imposing RPM to make the retailers choose appropriate actions.8
1Resale price maintenance arises when an upstream ﬁrm restricts a downstream ﬁrm to on-sell the products
of the upstream ﬁrm not below a price ﬂoor (minimum RPM), not above a price ceiling (maximum RPM)
or at a ﬁxed price (RPM).
2Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S., 2007.
3Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 (2010), Article 4a.
4EU Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (2010/C 130/01); Paragraph 223 states that an eﬃciency defense
in terms of Article 101,3 TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) is possible also for
minimum and ﬁxed RPM. Par. 224 and 225 contain examples of potentially detrimental and beneﬁcial
practices, respectively.
5Also see Brief by Comanor and Scherer as Amicus Curiae (No. 06-480) in Leegin (cf. fn. 2), p. 8; OECD
(2008) Policy Roundtables: Resale Price Maintenance, p. 12.
6Paragraph 225 of the EU Vertical Guidelines (cf. fn. 4) explicitly mentions that free-riding on pre-sale
advice of retailers in case of complex or experience goods may be a valid eﬃciency defense for minimum or
ﬁxed RPM.
7Cf. fn. 2, Opinion of the Court, part C, p. 16.
8Similarly, Marvel & McCaﬀerty (1984) model free-riding in the context of costly quality certiﬁcation by
2We do not doubt these well established service arguments according to which the single
manufacturer’s and consumers’ interests are generally aligned with respect to margins of
exclusive retailers.9 Albeit, in many RPM cases including Leegin, competing manufacturers
sell through common retailers. However, a manufacturer does not internalize the interests of
other manufacturers selling through the common retailer.
In particular, a manufacturer beneﬁts from services biased towards her products to the
detriment of competitors and consumers. It is plausible in several RPM cases that retailers
have inﬂuence on consumers’ choices through service. For example, in an attempt to justify
the Leegin decision, Elzinga and Mills (2008) cite Bear Stearns Equity Research (2002) to
emphasize the role of sales associates in retailing of specialty apparel: “[I]t is critical that
sales associates know the merchandise, have an understanding of the tastes and preferences
of the target customer, and can oﬀer fashion and wardrobing advice.” Other recent RPM
cases with common retailers and products where pre-sale advice potentially matters include
contact lenses10, hearing devices11 and consumer electronics.12 Another case in point are
books where RPM is common in several countries.
In this paper, we analyze the incentives of symmetric, diﬀerentiated manufacturers to use
resale price maintenance in the presence of common retailers that provide non-contractible
services such as pre-sale advice. By departing from the single manufacturer assumption
predominantly used in the literature on service and RPM, we identify a new rationale for
RPM: If retailers can use service to marginally shift demand between competing products,
a manufacturer can provide supra-competitive margins through minimum RPM to induce
retailers to oversell her products.
We ﬁnd that if retail price competition is strong relative to retailers’ ability to inﬂuence
consumer choice, a manufacturer can proﬁtably use minimum RPM to relax retail competition
on her product. This is the case even when only simple linear tariﬀs can be used, i.e. when
providing retail margins is costly for a manufacturer. If retail price competition is weak,
manufacturers use maximum RPM to reduce double marginalization. If both manufacturers
can enforce RPM, service is undistorted because both manufacturers use RPM symmetrically,
but wholesale and consumer prices are aﬀected.
retailers. Deneckere, Marvel & Peck (1997) and Krishnan & Winter (2007) introduce demand uncertainty
and spillovers in case of stockouts that yield sub-optimal inventories of retailers. RPM can correct for these
coordination failures and be beneﬁcial even in terms of consumer surplus. Clearly, a monopoly manufacturer
can only proﬁt from having an additional instrument such as RPM to solve her optimization problem and
thereby potentially increase vertical eﬃciency.
9It is well recognized in the literature that a mis-alignment may arise also here as the manufacturer
optimizes with respect to marginal consumers and competition policy may be concerned about the average
consumer. Also see Schulz (2007).
10Cf. ﬁne “Bußgeldbescheid B 3 - 123/08,” German Federal Cartel Oﬃce, September 2009.
11Press release “Bundeskartellamt verhängt Bußgeld gegen Hörgerätehersteller Phonak GmbH,” German
Federal Cartel Oﬃce, October 2009.
12Cf. press release “Bundeskartellamt verhängt Bußgelder wegen unzulässiger Preisbindung,” German
Federal Cartel Oﬃce, 2003.
3We ﬁnd that minimum RPM always increases consumer prices. For demand linear in
prices, minimum RPM reduces manufacturers’ proﬁts, but beneﬁts retailers. Hence, the
possibility to use minimum RPM creates a prisoner’s dilemma for manufacturers. On the
contrary, maximum RPM unambiguously reduces consumer prices and increases manufac-
turer proﬁts to the detriment of retailers.
The detrimental eﬀect of minimum RPM on consumer surplus and manufacturer rents is
driven by manufacturers’ competition for non-contractible retailer services that increase sales
of one product by diverting sales away from other products. By holding the overall service
level constant, we show that manufacturers rationally introduce minimum RPM if retail price
competition is strong. In equilibrium, this yields higher consumer prices even though service
quality is not aﬀected. Furthermore, if only one manufacturer is able to enforce RPM, service
and, thereby, consumer choice is distorted in equilibrium. This is in contrast to the common
wisdom that RPM is more harmful if frequently used in an industry.
For competition policy, it is crucial to discriminate between cases where free-riding among
retailers yields an insuﬃcient level of retailer services and cases in which overall service is not
at risk. The danger is that competition policy relies too much on the extensively modeled
service arguments with a single manufacturer which - overall - suggest beneﬁcial eﬀects of
RPM. Remarkably, several authors have pointed out that the free-riding argument is not
substantial in most RPM cases.13
Elzinga and Mills (2008) state that »Leegin’s policy bears none of the marks of those
economic theories of RPM that have anticompetitive eﬀects.« The goal of this paper is to
shed a more diﬀerentiated light on the eﬀects of RPM when competing manufacturers sell
through the same service providing retailers. By incorporating manufacturers’ competition
for favorable retailer services such as pre-sale advice, we demonstrate that providing service
incentives may not be a valid eﬃciency defense for minimum RPM.
Related literature
This paper is clearly related to the aforementioned literature on service and RPM in the
context of a single manufacturer. For a recent discussion see Winter (2009). We depart
from the predominantly used single manufacturer assumption commonly used to point out
that RPM can solve coordination failures in vertical structures. By introducing a second
manufacturer, we shed light on the competition for services provided by common retailers -
a coordination failure that is worsened by the additional instrument of RPM.
We are aware of two contributions also analyzing RPM in a setting with diﬀerentiated
manufacturers and common retailers. However, both do not consider service. Rey and Verge
13The dissenting Supreme Court Judge Breyer argues in this direction (cf. fn 2) and cites Pitofsky (1984)
and Scherer and Ross (1990), pp. 551–552 supporting this view, see also Klein (2009). Grimes (2009) states
that “there has, in fact, been no case before the Supreme Court in which free riding was established as the
motivation or justiﬁcation for imposing RPM”.
4(2010) build upon Bernheim and Whinston (1985) to show that monopolization in case of
a common agency and two-part tariﬀs can be extended to competing common agencies if
manufacturers can use RPM. Their result relies on eﬃcient two-part tariﬀs.14
Dobson and Waterson (2007) analyze bilateral Nash-bargaining between each manufacturer-
retailer pair over a linear wholesale price. They ﬁnd that if retailers have all the bargaining
power, retail prices are higher with RPM. If, instead, manufacturers possess all the bargaining
power, retail prices are higher without RPM due to double marginalization. Unfortunately,
Dobson & Waterson do not provide a comparison for cases with intermediate bargaining
power. Also, they gauge their setting too complex to analyze whether manufacturers would
like to use RPM.15 We take a diﬀerent approach by allowing manufacturers to make indus-
try wide take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers. Furthermore, we endogenize retailers’ buyer power which
stems from their abilities to marginally shift demand between products by using service. This
increases tractability as retailers do not take discrete decisions.
Inﬂuencing retailers’ service allocations through RPM has a resemblance to exclusion as
analyzed by Asker and Bar-Isaac (2011) and competition for exclusive retailers (Perry and
Besanko, 1991; Shaﬀer, 1992; Foros, Kind & Shaﬀer, 2011). However, these approaches do
not consider marginal service decisions.
Another related literature is that on multi-product advice. Inderst and Ottaviani (2011)
analyze the eﬀects of disclosure on commissions that a single intermediary receives from selling
competing products such as healthcare services or ﬁnancials. They ﬁnd that commissions
are higher without disclosure, but that disclosure may lead to an ineﬃciently small market
share of more eﬃcient product providers. In a similar vein, Raskovich (2007) considers how
manufacturers inﬂuence a single, product information providing retailer through favorable
margins. He concludes that matching competition clauses may have socially desirable eﬀects.
Brekke et al. (2010) consider a pharmacist’s decision to persuade patients with a brand-
name prescription to purchase a generic drug instead. They provide empirical evidence that
pharmacists’ marginal monetary incentives have a strong inﬂuence on generic drug sales.16
These approaches share with our micro-foundation of service that an intermediary’s
matching advice depends on the products’ proﬁtabilities. However, none of these papers
considers price competition between retailers and the incentives of a manufacturer to relax
this competition by using RPM. Analyzing a manufacturer’s individual incentives to use
RPM and the resulting competitive eﬀects compared to a situation in which RPM is not
feasible is the core of the present paper.
14Eﬃcient means that all rents can beextracted through up-front fees.
15See Dobson & Waterson (2007), fn. 26.
16Other papers dealing with biased retailer advice include Hagiu & Jullien (2011) and White (2009) who
investigate why an internet search engine may optimally divert search. Dziuda (2011) shows that an expert
can use strategic argumentation to mislead clients searching for the best match, although he is known to be
biased. Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2010) show that credit rating agencies may mislead naive consumers
as long as reputation costs are not too high. Also see Inderst & Ottaviani (2009) for over-selling of a single
product in case of multiple retailer services.
5Outline
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In the next section, we set up the model.
The solution is presented in Section 3 with a discussion following in Section 4. We present
extensions in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
2 Model
2.1 Setting
Two symmetric, diﬀerentiated single product manufacturers (i = A, B) sell their products
to consumers through two symmetric, diﬀerentiated multi-product retailers (k = 1, 2). We
focus on intrinsic common agencies, i.e. take the market structure as given.17 Marginal costs
of manufacturing and retailing are assumed to be constant and normalized to zero. One unit
of a product i sold by a retailer requires one unit produced by manufacturer i. All ﬁrms are
active only if proﬁts are non-negative.
We further assume that a manufacturer is restricted to charge a linear wholesale price
wi that is the same for both retailers.18 Let W = (wA,wB) denote the vector of publicly
observable wholesale prices. Hence, no commitment problem of a manufacturer with respect
to wholesale prices arises.19
Demand for good i at retailer k is denoted by Di,k(P,S) where P = (pA,1,pA,2,pB,1,pB,2)
is a price vector containing all consumer prices pi,k for any good i = A,B at any retailer
k = 1,2. S = (s1,s2) denotes the vector of service instruments available to retailer 1 and 2,










The goal pursued with this model is to investigate the eﬀects of allowing manufacturers to
control retail prices when there is discretion of retailers over the allocation of service S. It is
17Zhang (1993) shows that common agents can mitigate the incentive problem of selling badly suited
products to consumers. Hence, he provides a rationale for why common retailers exist.
18Linear wholesale prices may seem restrictive. However, they provide a clear-cut benchmark case in which
incentivizing retailers through positive margins is costly for manufacturers. The logic of our argument extends
to non-linear contracts as well, see subsection 4.2.
19See Rey & Vergé (2004) for a discussion of how RPM helps a single manufacturer who can not commit
to wholesale contracts.
20The index xi,k denotes that a variable x is speciﬁc to manufacturer/product i at retailer k. −i and −k
denote the other manufacturer/product and retailer, respectively.
6assumed that contracts can not be conditioned on S, i.e. a retailer’s service is a non-veriﬁable
action. Although some actions such as speciﬁc advertisements can potentially be contracted
on, this assumption seems reasonable for other aspects such as pre-sale matching advice.
We restrict our attention to non-collusive behavior, i.e. consider only a one shot game
and no horizontal contracts among manufacturers or retailers.21 Two regimes are considered:
(I) RPM is not enforceable, (II) RPM is enforceable and can be introduced unilaterally by
any manufacturer in the ﬁrst stage. If manufacturer i ﬁxes the retail price pR
i , it must be
maintained by both retailers. Note that if a retailer’s proﬁt function is single peaked in his
retail price, a price ﬁxing (if eﬀectively constraining retailers) acts either as minimum or
maximum RPM as a retailer either wants to decrease or increase the price to raise his proﬁts.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Each manufacturer ﬁxes either only a uniform wholesale price (wi) or both the wholesale
and the retail price (wi,pR
i ) (in regime (II) if RPM is used by manufacturer i).
2. Each retailer observes the prices ﬁxed by manufacturers and sets his retail prices pi,k
(restricted to pi,k = pR
i under regime (II) if manufacturer i uses RPM) and allocates
service sk.
3. Demand realizes.
Backward induction is used to solve the game for subgame perfect Nash equilibria. An
equilibrium is characterized by the price and service vectors W, P, S and manufacturers’
decisions to employ RPM under regime (II). For an overview, see Figure 1.
21See Jullien & Rey (2007) for RPM facilitating manufacturer collusion in a repeated game with idiosyn-
cratic demand shocks at the retailer level.
7Figure 1: Industry structure
2.2 Demand
For many products such as shoes, clothing, contact lenses and glasses, OTC pharmaceuticals,
books, several ﬁnancial and travel services, retailers commonly carry diﬀerentiated products
of several manufacturers. On the other side, incompletely informed consumers often seek
pre-sale advice from retailers to ﬁnd the best match. Consequently, a retailer tends to have
some discretion to inﬂuence which product is being chosen by a consumer. Both Raskovich
(2007) and Inderst and Ottaviani (2011) show that the sales agent may use such discretion
to steer demand towards more proﬁtable products. In line with these papers, we assume that
retailers are better informed than consumers about match suitability among horizontally
diﬀerentiated products.
Consider the following situation: Consumers are ex-ante uninformed about the existence
of two symmetric products A and B and their valuations for both. However, it is common
knowledge that to each consumer only one of the two products provides positive utility.
When a consumer visits a retailer and asks for advice, the retailer receives a noisy signal
which corresponds to the probability that the particular consumer likes product A, and with
complementary probability product B. Upon receiving the signal, the retailer can present one
product to the consumer.22 A retailer’s choice of which product to present to which consumer
22More generally, if a consumer has limited attention or time, a retailer will only be able to present a subset
8is captured by the service allocation sk. This corresponds to a threshold probability such
that the retailer advises a consumer towards product A if the probability that the consumer
prefers that product is above the threshold level, and product B otherwise. The signals a
retailer receives over consumers’ preferences are symmetrically distributed around zero such
that sk = 0 denotes unbiased advice, i.e. the likelihood of a successful match is maximized.
After the product presentation, each consumer is equipped with existence information of
that product. In a next step she learns her valuations and the prices at both diﬀerentiated
retailers, for example by consulting friends or browsing the internet.23 Hence, consumers are
completely informed when they choose if and where to buy a single unit of the preferred
product. However, a consumer that has been presented a product that provides her with
non-positive utility is assumed to stop searching. In consequence, retailers loose potential
buyers when they provide biased advice.
This yields the following functional form of demand for product i at retailer k:
Di,k = di,k(pi,k,pi,−k)Mi(s1,s2) (1)
For a more detailed derivation of this demand, see Appendix B. Di,k has the notable feature
that it is multiplicatively separable into two components: Firstly, Mi, which is the aggregate
mass of consumers that are informed about product i and prefer it over product −i (6=
i). Secondly, di,k(pi,k,pi,−k), which denotes the probability that a consumer who has been
successfully matched to product i purchases the product from retailer k.
We assume that retailers independently contribute to a pool of consumers interested in a
speciﬁc product, Mi which is given by
(A0) Mi = mi,1(s1) + mi,2(s2).
mi,k denotes the mass of consumers successfully matched to product i by retailer k. Recall
that a consumer obtains positive utility from at most one of the two products. Thus to
a consumer matched with a product that provides him positive gross utility, prices for the
other product are irrelevant. In consequence, di,k(pi,k,pi,−k) depends only on Pi = (pi,k, pi,−k)
(A1). Hence, the consumer is completely informed about payoﬀ relevant states at the point
of purchase. However, a consumer only buys a good match if her idiosyncratic valuation net
of additional shopping costs and price is positive.24
For technical tractability we assume that mi,k(sk) is non-negative and twice continu-
ously diﬀerentiable. Furthermore, products are symmetric and demand can be inﬂuenced
of the products that potentially interest the consumer.
23The underlying rationale is that price information is less costly to obtain than match information. For
tractability, we therefore abstract from additionally considering price search explicitly.
24Ruling out that the decision of buying product i depends on prices of product −i and having pricing
decision independent of the matching decision considerably increases tractability, but does not drive the
results. See subsection 5.1 for a extension with direct price competition.
9monotonically by retailers through sk with ∂skmA,k(sk) > 0 > ∂skmB,k(sk).25 Symmetry of
the products implies m−i,k(sk) = mi,k(−sk) and, in turn, the aggregate mass of successful
matches over both products induced by retailer k can be represented by mi,k(sk)+mi,k(−sk).
The notion that biasing advice reduces the likelihood of successful matches is captured in
the assumption that mi,k(sk) is strictly concave in sk (A2).26 The aggregate mass of successful
matches by a retailer is maximized when advice is unbiased, i.e. 0 = argmaxsk(mi,k(sk) +
m−i,k(sk)). We normalize Mi(0,0) ≡ 1.
Recall that our setup implies that for equal retail prices, confronting consumers who
apparently have a preference for product A with product B instead, reduces the likelihood
that the consumer will eventually buy any product. Similarly, for experience goods, bad
matches may cause no loss of demand in the current period, but a low match quality is likely
to decrease a retailer’s future demand due to fewer repeated purchases or a worse reputation
for good advice, cf. Inderst and Ottaviani (2011). The eﬀectiveness of the service instruments
is deﬁned by the size of this trade-oﬀ, i.e. the smaller the total loss for a given shift, the






denote the ability of a retailer k to shift demand when starting at the neutral point of sk = 0,
λ ∈ (0,∞).
λ measures the curvature of mi,k evaluated at sk = 0. The greater λ is, the less costly
it is for a retailer to shift demand. Intuitively, the more concave mi,k(sk) is, the more total
demand decreases when moving away from the neutral position of sk = 0 at which mA,k(sk)+
mB,k(−sk) is maximized. In the following, we also call λ the intensity of manufacturers’
competition for retailer services.
We ﬁnally impose the following standard demand assumptions on di,k(pi,k,pi,−k):





(pi,l)2di,k(pi,k,pi,−k) ≤ 0 l = k,−k.
Assumption (A3) states that the own price eﬀect is negative and dominates the positive cross
price eﬀect in magnitude. This is standard for imperfect substitutes. Assumptions (A4) and
25We denote by ∂xf the partial derivative of f with respect to x.
26Note that these assumptions imply that for any positive constant z, mi,k(s) + z mi,k(−s) has a unique
maximizer characterized by the FOC ∂smi,k(s) − z ∂smi,k(−s) = 0.
10(A5) ensure (weak) concavity of demand and in turn the existence of a unique solution to re-
tailers’ pricing for each product i that is not subject to RPM.27 For notational convenience, we
sometimes use the shortcuts di,k(p) ≡ di,k (p,p) and ∂pidi,k(p) ≡ ∂pi,kdi,k (p,p)+∂pi,−kdi,k (p,p).
Note that the pre-sale service provided at a retailer has positive rather than negative
externalities on the other retailer. In other words, we allow for retailers’ free riding on each
others’ services (retailer k beneﬁts from matches of retailer −k). This does not necessarily
imply a market failure even if service is costly at the margin because retailers may charge
a price for the matching service. Alternatively, one can assume that consumer who seek
advice only consider buying at the service providing retailer while, additionally, there are
consumers ex-ante informed who consider buying at both stores. If price discrimination
between informed and uninformed consumers is not feasible, the resulting demand function
has similar properties.
We take the precision of the retailers screening to be exogenous. Hence, the service quality,
i.e. how successful retailers match consumers to products is only inﬂuenced by a retailer’s
bias. A retailer’s decision over sk may depend on the margins earned on each product A and
B. However, as signal precision is not aﬀected, the mass of successfully adviced consumers
by a retailer k, mi,k(sk) + m−i,k(sk), does not increase as all margins increase.
Naturally, one may endogenize the precision of the screening and, so to speak, the overall
level of service. However, by keeping the overall service level constant, we provide a clear
demonstration that RPM may be desirable for manufacturers to increase incentives for special
service without having an overall positive service eﬀect. The previous literature on RPM
and service has intensively analyzed the eﬀect of retail margins on product speciﬁc service.
Including this eﬀect would not add much too the model. It is clear that in speciﬁc competition
policy cases, both eﬀects need to accounted for. We further discuss this issue in subsection
4.1.
3 Solution
3.1 A benchmark without service
For this case we assume that retailers have no instrument to shift demand between products.
This corresponds to the excluded case of ∂skMi = ∂s−kMi = 0, implying that λ = 0. Thus,
Mi degenerates to a scaling factor normalized to 1 and demand becomes
Di,k = di,k(pi,k,pi,−k).
Note that there are no direct price eﬀects between products A and B by assumption (A1).
In eﬀect, each manufacturer becomes an upstream monopolist facing two retailers under
27In particular, these assumptions imply that the Hessian of dik has a negative dominant main diagonal.
11imperfect competition. Without RPM, a double marginalization problem arises, i.e. the




Instead, if RPM is available, a manufacturer will use it to reduce retail margins to zero.
Clearly, there is no reason to incentivize a retailer trough positive margins as he can not
inﬂuence sales and his outside option is null.28 The manufacturer will consequently set her
wholesale price equal to the monopoly price, i.e. wR = pR = pM. In this case, RPM acts
as a price ceiling, i.e. each retailer would gain from unilaterally increasing his retailer price
above pR. RPM solves the double marginalization problem of excessively high prices for this
vertical structure. This is the classic argument in favor of maximum RPM dating back to at
least Spengler (1950).
In the following, we consider the case where retailers have inﬂuence on consumer choice,
i.e. λ > 0 as implied by Deﬁnition 1. Thus product demands become interdependent and
manufacturers have to compete for favorable retail services.
3.2 Equilibrium without resale price maintenance (regime I)
Assume that no manufacturer can use RPM. Consequently, manufacturers only set wholesale
prices in the ﬁrst stage. Diﬀerent from the benchmark case above, a manufacturer addition-
ally needs to account for the service allocations S that retailers choose in the subgame for







Diﬀerentiating Rk with respect to pi,k and imposing symmetry pi,k = pi,−k = p∗












i) = 0. (3)
Assumptions (A4) and (A5) on the concavity of di,k(·) imply that condition (3) characterizes
the relationship between retail and wholesale price, denoted by p∗
i(wi). Observe that a
retailer sets prices in best reply to the other retailer’s prices to maximize the proﬁtability
of each product, i.e. (pi,k − wi)di,k(pi,k,pi,−k). This decision is independent of the mass
Mi of consumers demanding that product. Furthermore, p∗
i(wi) is independent of the other
wholesale price w−i. This follows from assumption (A1) of no direct cross price eﬀects
between products. Thus a retailer’s pricing decision is separable from her service decision.
In summary:
28We neglect that market structure may adjust in response to diﬀerent margins. This is in line with most
of the literature on RPM; notable exceptions are Perry & Porter (1990) and Reisinger & Schnitzer (2010).
See subsection 4.1 for a discussion on retailing costs.
12Lemma 1. If demand is given by (1) and manufacturer i does not use RPM, the price p∗
i(wi)
set by each retailer in the unique symmetric equilibrium of the retailing subgame increases
monotonically in the manufacturer’s wholesale price wi, but is independent of Mi and w−i.
The retail margin p∗
i(wi)−wi decreases monotonically in wi and in the intensity of competition
between retailers.
Proof. Omitted proofs are in the appendix.
The regularity assumption and in particular strict concavity (A6) on mi,k imply that the
optimal interior service allocation s∗
k for a retailer is characterized by the respective FOC,














−i) = 0. (4)
Intuitively, a retailer uses his service instrument to shift mass to the product that is more
proﬁtable. For symmetric wholesale and - strictly larger - retail prices, the condition reduces
to ∂skmi,k(s∗
k)+∂skm−i,k(s∗
k) = 0. This is uniquely solved by s∗
k = 0 because biasing decreases
total demand due to assumption (A6). If exactly one margin is zero, sk is set to maximize
demand for the other product. If both margins are zero, the retailer is indiﬀerent between
all sk.
Without RPM, a manufacturer can only increase the proﬁtability of her product for
retailers by lowering her wholesale price.29 But that suﬃces to introduce competition among
manucturers for favorable service allocations.
Lemma 2. Without RPM, an increase of manufacturer i’s wholesale price wi induces re-
tailers to allocate service away from product i by adjusting sk. The marginal eﬀect of an
increase of wi on service set by retailers, evaluated at symmetric wholesale and retail prices
wA = wB = wN and p∗
A = p∗
































29This is possible as the derivative of a retailer’s expected proﬁt from a consumer informed about product i








for non-extreme competition at the retailing level because then (p∗
i − wi) > 0 and ∂wip∗
i < 1.
13To ensure that a symmetric equilibrium exists, we assume that reduced form proﬁts πi(wi,w−i)
are quasi-concave in wi (A6) and that the equilibrium is locally stable. By symmetry of the
objective functions, this amounts to |∂2
wiw−iπi(wN,wN)/∂2
wiwiπi(wN,wN)| < 1 where wN de-
notes the equilibrium wholesale price (A7). This holds for reasonable parametrizations of
demand.30 Diﬀerentiating πi with respect to wi, applying symmetry wA = wB ≡ wN and



















There is essentially the usual trade-oﬀ between price and quantity, with the particularity
that the quantity eﬀect works through two channels: The one is the standard channel of
a higher retail price and thus a decreased likelihood that a consumer is willing to buy the
product. This is the ﬁrst summand in the brackets. The other channel is the reduced retailer
proﬁtability of the product induced by increased input costs wi. In consequence, retailers
allocate service and, thereby, potential buyers away from product i.
Note that the marginal proﬁt decreases in λ. Intuitively, the fewer interested buyers a
retailer looses when proposing the more proﬁtable product, the more he is willing to reallocate
service in response to an increased proﬁtability of a product. If retailers cannot inﬂuence
consumer choice at all, i.e. λ = 0, the equilibrium is that of the benchmark case in 3.1
where Mi is exogenous and a manufacturer acts as a monopolist facing retailers in imperfect
competition.










The equilibrium wholesale price wN decreases in retailers’ ability to shift demand, i.e. ∂λwN <







Retailers’ equilibrium margins decreases in wN as 0 < ∂wip∗
i < 1.
Note that the wholesale price in equation (7) is implicitly deﬁned as pN is a function of
the wholesale price. Still, under the assumption (A7) of local stability of the equilibrium,
it can be shown that the wholesale price decreases as retailers’ ability to steer demand, λ,
increases.
30For example, if di,k(pi,k,pi,−k) is linear in prices and mA,k = 4/6(1 − (−sk + 0.5)2) = mB,k(−sk) this
property is fulﬁlled. See Appendix B for a sketch of the derivation of mi,k.
143.3 Equilibrium with resale price maintenance (regime II)
Consider that no manufacturer has used RPM before, but now RPM becomes feasible for
manufacturer A. Manufacturer A can reproduce the equilibrium prices without RPM by
setting pR
A = pN and wR
A = wN. Hence, she is at least as good oﬀ when deviating to use
RPM.31 Manufacturer A using RPM faces the following trade-oﬀs:
• decreasing wA reduces her own margin, but increases the retail margin pA − wA, i.e.
induces retailers to increase the sales of product A using service;
• increasing pA decreases the likelihood dA(pA,pA) that consumers are willing to buy
product A but increases the retail margin.
To ensure the existence of a symmetric equilibrium, we again assume that πi(wi,pi) is quasi-
concave in both wi and pi. Again, this holds under reasonable demand parametrizations.32
Given the two instruments (wA, pA), it is shown in the proof to Lemma 3 that it is optimal
for the manufacturer to set the monopoly price pR
A = pM to maximize the joint rent obtainable
from her product, independent of the prices of the other product. Intuitively, this is the case
because we have assumed away direct price competition among the two products to keep the
model tractable. Otherwise, the retail price is in general a function of the competitor’s retail
price, see Section 5.1 for this extension. However, in the present setting a manufacturer sets
pR
A = pM and wA to maximize







thereby trading oﬀ the beneﬁt of increasing her per unit proﬁt wA with the marginal loss of
consumers due to the decreased incentive pM − wA of the retailers. In summary:
Lemma 3. A manufacturer i has an individual incentive to introduce RPM and set pR
i = pM.
Since it is a manufacturer’s dominant strategy to use RPM and set the retail price at the
monopoly level, it is immediately clear that both manufacturers will do so in any equilib-
rium in which both use RPM. The optimal wholesale price, however, depends on the other
manufacturer’s wholesale price.







31It is not surprising to see that the additional instrument is used if a manufacturer can not commit to not
use it. However, one can show that equilibria with RPM still exist if the choice of RPM is made beforehand
in a stage 0. Note also that RPM is only unambigously dominant here as there are by assumption no
enforcement costs.
32The parametrization in fn. 30 again does the job.
15The wholesale price is weakly smaller than the retail price, i.e. wR ≤ pM, and decreases in
the ability of retailers to shift demand, λ.
3.4 Competitive eﬀects of RPM
A unilateral introduction of RPM is always weakly proﬁtable for a manufacturer. However,
collectively manufacturers can be worse oﬀ, i.e. the enforceability of RPM can impose a
prisoner’s dilemma on manufacturers.
Resale price maintenance imposes a dilemma for manufacturers if and only if the equi-













RPM allows a manufacturer to maximize the proﬁt for the vertical structure by either avoid-
ing double marginalization or increasing the retail prices of her product to the monopoly
level. However, RPM eliminates intra-brand price competition of retailers and allows a man-
ufacturer to directly control the retail margin on her product. This additional control induces
manufacturers to compete harder for retail services and can thus be collectively undesirable
for manufacturers.
We model RPM as price ﬁxing. However, if RPM is a binding constraint to retailers,
it acts either as a price ﬂoor or a price ceiling. These two cases can be distinguished by
answering the simple question: Would a retailer proﬁt from reducing or increasing the price
relative to the price ﬁxed by the manufacturer? By evaluating the retailers’ FOC with respect
to retail prices, we obtain the following:





If the above inequality is reversed, manufacturers use RPM as a price ceiling. In case of
equality, there is eﬀectively no RPM.
We identify two countervailing drivers that determine whether RPM is used as a price
ﬂoor or a price ceiling: Service competition and double marginalization. A manufacturer
has an incentive to use minimum RPM to raise the retail margin of her product to induce
favorable retailer services. This desire becomes the more important, the better retailers can
inﬂuence demand, i.e. the larger λ is. However, without RPM, retailers already add margins
on top of manufacturers’ wholesale prices. If intra-brand price competition is weak relative
to retailer’s ability to inﬂuence consumer choice, a manufacturer desires to use maximum
RPM to decrease the retail margin.
16For example, consider that retailers face hardly any price competition. Then the RHS
of the above inequality (10) becomes very large as the price eﬀect ∂pi,−kdi,k(pM,pM) is close
to zero. For a given level of retailers’ ability to steer demand, λ, suﬃciently weak retail
price competition implies that manufacturers use maximum RPM. On the contrary, if retail
competition is close to Bertrand, the RHS of (10) is close to zero and the inequality holds
even for very weak retailer inﬂuence on consumers’ product choices (λ close to zero).
For a given level of overall service, the essential question from a welfare point of view is
whether RPM increases prices and harms consumers. From a competition policy perspective,
a related and important question is whether the eﬀects of minimum and maximum RPM can
be clearly distinguished in the sense that only minimum RPM can harm consumers.
First, we establish the condition under which the enforceability and, in equilibrium, the
use of RPM increases consumer prices.
Lemma 5. RPM increases equilibrium prices, i.e. the monopoly price set under RPM, pM,





Correspondingly, RPM decreases consumer prices iﬀ the above inequality is reversed. For
λ = λM ≡
−∂pi,kdi,k(pN,pN)
∂pi,−kdi,k(pN,pN) − 1, RPM has no price eﬀect.
Comparing the conditions for minimum RPM (10) and a consumer price increase through
RPM (11) reveals a striking similarity. The same eﬀects as for minimum can be identiﬁed:
More service competition among manufacturers and harsher retailer price competition, i.e.
lower double marginalization in case of no RPM, favor RPM to be price increasing. Further-
more it can be shown that:
Proposition 3. Minimum RPM always increases consumer prices and maximum RPM al-
ways decreases consumer prices. Therefore, banning minimum RPM and allowing maximum
RPM is welfare optimal.
For an intuition of the proof, consider that λ = λM. It follows that pN = pM and the
right hand sides of condition (10) and (11) coincide. Hence, there is neither maximum nor
minimum RPM. Raising λ above λM decreases pN (i.e. condition (11) holds) and implies
that the minimum RPM condition (10) holds. Analogously, for a decrease of λ below λM,
pN increases and maximum RPM results.
Proposition 3 suggests a simple optimal policy which is to forbid minimum RPM as it
unambiguously increases consumer prices. This is a clear-cut result. However, a caveat
applies. Symmetric increases of retail margins in our model have no positive welfare eﬀect as
they do not aﬀect the overall quality of service that is exogenous to the model. See subsection
4.1 for a discussion of the case when overall service quality depends on the overall level of
17retail margins. Still, the result provides a clear benchmark that minimum RPM is harmful if
there is no threat that the overall level of service for this product category would be socially
insuﬃcient without RPM.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that a manufacturer individually desires to introduce min-
imum RPM to increase retailer services for her product, although collectively manufacturers
may loose. Indeed, it can be shown that:
Lemma 6. If demand is linear in prices, banning minimum RPM is both in the interest of
consumers and manufacturers while maximum RPM beneﬁts these parties. For retailers, the
reverse holds.
For linear demand, increasing the proﬁt pie of the supply side by using minimum RPM is
collectively never in the interest of manufacturers. A caveat applies, as this result is derived
for linear wholesale contracts, see 4.2 for a further discussion of this issue. Nevertheless, it
is apparently the ﬁrst time that it has been formally shown that minimum RPM can impose
a prisoner’s dilemma on manufacturers.
4 Discussion
The previous analysis has revealed a pattern that can be summarized as follows: If retail-
ers’ price competition is strong relative to retailers’ ability to inﬂuence consumer choice,
each manufacturer individually attempts to introduce minimum RPM to increase retailers’
incentives to bias service towards her product.
From a single manufacturer’s perspective, raising retail margins through minimum RPM
increases incentives for service and yields more special service for her products. Hence, a
manufacturer can demonstrate that her usage of minimum RPM is eﬀective in increasing
services for her products that are (from his perspective) underprovided if there is strong
price competition of retailers.
In the EU, such a demonstration may lead to an eﬃciency defense according to TFEU
101,3 as sketched by the new EU vertical guidelines, cf. fn. 4. However, if the current model
applies and manufacturers compete for special retailer services (e.g. favored sales advice),
there is no eﬃciency gain induced by minimum RPM. Asymmetric RPM may even worsen
consumer choice.
4.1 Endogenizing the overall service level
A central eﬃciency argument in favor of minimum RPM is that retailers can free ride upon
costly service. Note that free-riding occurs in the present model because consumers who are
matched by the one retailer can also buy at the other retailer, hence both retailers beneﬁt
18from each others’ matching services. However, so far no ineﬃciency through free-riding arose
as the overall level of service does not depend on retail margins.
Instead, consider that a service-providing retailer has to invest in matching quality and
costs are increasing in the precision of the signal. If the retailer can not charge for the
matching service and price competition with the other retailer forces margins towards zero
on each product, the signal may be insuﬃciently precise in equilibrium. In principle, a
vertical restraint such as RPM can increase eﬃciency in this case. However, recall that this
argument - as well as the present model - abstracts from a consumer’s choices of where to
seek advice in the ﬁrst place. This becomes relevant if signal quality is endogenous.
However, if the signal quality chosen by each retailer is observed by the manufacturers
before they set prices, retailers may have an incentive to be less informed, i.e. to choose
lower signal qualities. For an intuition, consider two extremes: If each retailer is perfectly
informed about each consumer’s preference, diﬀerences in products’ proﬁtabilities do not
change the service allocations. Instead, if each retailer receives an uninformative signal for
each consumer, they will advice all consumers to the more proﬁtable product. It is straight
forward that a manufacturer has a stronger incentives to ensure a high retail proﬁtability
of her product in the latter case. Furthermore, RPM enhances a manufacturer’s ability to
inﬂuence this retail proﬁtability by directly setting the retail margin. Hence, it is likely that
retailers have a stronger incentive to be less informed in case manufacturers can use RPM.
Furthermore, it is not clear that a manufacturer is individually willing to ﬁnance a multi-
brand retailer’s matching services such as pre-sale advice that would beneﬁt all manufactur-
ers. Increasing retailers’ proﬁts through minimum RPM seems more plausible if the high
margins induce retailers to particularly favor the sales of the granting manufacturer’s prod-
ucts.33
A case in point is a recent antitrust case in which Ciba Vision, a manufacturer of contact
lenses, eﬀectively used RPM through recommended retail prices and price monitoring to
undermine price erosion through opticians’ distribution via the internet.34 This case ﬁts well
to our argument: Opticians provide intensive matching services for contact lenses of several
manufacturers that are not likely to break down if the margins for one manufacturer are
low. Opticians may even charge consumers for ﬁtting contact lenses, hence underprovision
of matching services may not be an issue. However, opticians are potentially inclined to ﬁt
rather those lenses on which margins are high, not least to make proﬁts from repurchases.35
Interestingly, manufacturers’ individual incentives to bias matching may actually yield a
socially desirable level of service quality in spite of its public good properties for a single
manufacturer. This could occur if matching quality is insuﬃcient without RPM and the
33Even with only a single manufacturer, the desired level of service may diﬀer between manufacturer and
the average consumer as the former optimization accounts for the marginal consumer’s preferences, see for
example Schulz (2007).
34Cf. fn. 10.
35For an antitrust analysis of free-riding and RPM in the context of internet retailing see Lao (2010).
19quality of matching depends positively on retail margins.
However, if the overall level of service is not insuﬃcient without RPM, minimum RPM
potentially yields excessive retail proﬁts, excessive service or excessive entry at the retail
level.
4.2 Non-linear wholesale contracts
The assumption of linear wholesale contracts is also made by Dobson & Waterson (2007).
That more sophisticated two-part tariﬀs are not necessary for minimum RPM to be harmful is
a point in itself. Our result of a competitive dilemma relies on the assumption that providing
retail margins is costly for a manufacturer (i.e. a manufacturer can not fully extract rents
through two-part tariﬀs), but it does not rely on linear tariﬀs.
Consider that competition drives retail margins close to zero without RPM and that there
is service competition. Note that a manufacturer, say A, could oﬀer contracts to retailers
that impose a positive margin on her products via RPM and additionally ask them to transfer
all additional proﬁts. The marginal decision of retailers remains unaﬀected by the lump-sum
fees. Hence, retailers match consumers excessively to products of type A which beneﬁts the
manufacturer without costs to her due to the lump-sum fee.
If both manufacturers use lump-sum fees, each has to consider that retailers’ opportunity
proﬁt to paying the fee and carrying an additional brand is that of exclusively carrying the
other brand. This opportunity proﬁt is generally not zero. This by itself puts a limit on the
fee level. See Rey & Vergé (2010) for a more detailed discussion of this issue.
However, if for exogenous reasons the lump sum-fees are restricted to be small (e.g.,
because wholesale arbitrage is feasible to retailers, retailers’ risk aversion or rebate arrange-
ments are forbidden), for small enough fees both retailers will carry both products and the
manufacturer dilemma prevails.
4.3 Price erosion
“In the experience of the Bundeskartellamt, as regards the pricing of products, an important
concern for producers is downward pressure on prices at the retail level. In that respect, e-
mail or other correspondence by producers telling resellers that they are selling a high quality
product which must therefore not be sold at low prices is not uncommon. Producers seem to
be afraid that a general erosion of prices charged to the ﬁnal consumer will ultimately lead to
retailers bargaining harder and demanding lower prices from their suppliers. One objective
of producers therefore is to secure stable (high) prices.”36
This statement is puzzling in a setting with a single manufacturer. Suppose that with
RPM, wholesale and retail prices are given by (wR, pR). If now minimum RPM is abolished,
36Cf. OECD (2008), p. 143
20a lower retail price level p∗(wR) < pR will result. As ∂wp∗ > 0, the retail price level pR can
easily be restored by setting a higher wholesale price. Hence, price erosion can easily be
avoided.
However, the argument of price erosion in the sense of lower wholesale prices is under-
standable in light of competition for retail services. Consider an equilibrium with strong, but
imperfect retailer competition and minimum RPM as characterized in Lemma 4. Assume
now that manufacturer B cannot use RPM anymore (e.g. because of an antitrust litigation
or because retailer coordination on a recommended retail price breaks down). Hence, price
setting takes place with one manufacturer using RPM (say A) and the other one (say B)
not. Due to strong retailer competition, any retail margin p∗
B(wB)−wB on product B will be
relatively small while manufacturer A can freely set the margin pA−wA. Retailers’ expected
proﬁt of selling a unit of product B, dB,k(p∗(wB))(p∗
B(wB) − wB), decreases in wB and so does
MB as service adjusts in wholesale prices. Intuitively, it may be optimal for manufacturer B
to set a low wB in order to sustain incentives of retailers to sell product B.
Solving the asymmetric game in reduced form is involved as implicit derivatives have to be
evaluated at various points. Therefore, we solve the game for MB(s) = 1/2(1−(s+0.5)2), s ∈





β2−γ2 pi−k with α = 0.3, β =
0.2, γ = 0.198. This yields wA = 13/100, pA = pM = 15/100, wB = 9.4/100, pB = 9.6/100. Service
is still tilted towards product A (s = 0.21). With symmetric RPM, wR = 10/100. Hence,
under asymmetric RPM manufacturer B optimally sets a lower wholesale price than under
symmetric RPM to increase demand.
This retail price “erosion” ﬁts well with the above citation, even without modeling bargain-
ing explicitly. The logic is related, however: The instrument of RPM allows a manufacturer
to increase the pie of the vertical chain and at the same time secure retailers a larger share
that incentivizes sales of product B. In the above speciﬁcation price erosion occurs for γ close
to β, i.e. strong retailing competition.
4.4 Asymmetric resale price maintenance and service quality
If RPM is enforceable, using it is a dominant strategy for a manufacturer. This yields a
symmetric equilibrium in which both manufacturers use RPM. Consumer harm stems from
an increase in the price level. In contrast, imagine that manufacturer B can not enforce RPM
while manufacturer A can. If retailer price competition is close to Bertrand, manufacturer A
can proﬁtably impose an above-competitive retail margin by introducing minimum RPM. In
eﬀect, consumers are dis-proportionately often exposed to the expensive A product as in the
numerical example above where consumers c.p. would prefer that service is tilted towards
the cheaper product B. In case of pre-sale advice, matching is biased in equilibrium, yielding
a low match value and a welfare loss.
This argument, though highly stylized, suggests that the presumption of RPM being
21more harmful if used by many manufacturers in a market (which may be true if the reason is
collusion among manufacturers) may not extend to the case of service competition. Rather,
if retail competition is strong, asymmetric RPM tends to cause biased sales advice while
symmetric RPM yields unbiased advice but a higher price level.
Similarly, the presumption that RPM is less harmful if used by manufacturers with little
market power (often measured as a small market share and possibly low proﬁts) is not
straightforward to support in the context of competition for retailer services.37
5 Extensions
5.1 Direct inter-brand price competition
Assumption (A1) of no cross price eﬀects between products A and B simpliﬁed the previous
exposition but is certainly not always correct.
One way to relax this assumption is to assume that there are two types of consumers:
Informed and uninformed ones with shares δ and 1 − δ, respectively. Informed consumers
know their match values with both products A and B and hence their demand depends on
all four prices but not on service, denote this as fi,k(P). Uninformed consumers demand is
the one discussed above, hence overall demand can be written as
Di,k = δ fi,k(P) + (1 − δ)di,k(Pi)Mi,k(S). (12)
Note that a retailer’s service decision as a function of prices as characterized by (4) remains
unaﬀected. However, a retailer’s FOC with respect to price pi,k is now given by
δ
h




(pi,k − wi)∂pi,kdi,k(Pi) + di,k(Pi)
i
= 0.
Intuitively, the equilibrium price of the subgame is a linear combination of the equilibrium
prices when all consumers are informed (δ = 1) and when all are uninformed (δ = 0).
Similarly, a manufacturer faces
∂wiπi = (1 − δ)[di(p
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We conjecture that at least for small δ, the results derived for δ = 0 in the main part of
37Interestingly, Foros, Kind & Shaﬀer (2011) argue that restrictions on the extent of the market that can
be covered by RPM as found in the vertical restraints guidelines of the EU and the US may be detrimental
to welfare. Their argument is based on the insight of Shaﬀer (1991) that symmetric RPM is not eﬀective in
increasing prices which is unrelated to the matching bias discussed here.
22this paper remain qualitatively valid.
Interestingly, another manufacturer’s dilemma may arise as the fraction of informed con-
sumers becomes large. Using (maximum) RPM is a manufacturer’s dominant strategy in
the present timing. However, committing to not control retail prices via RPM may increase
proﬁts as it relaxes manufacturers’ competition. See Bonanno & Vickers (1988) and Rey &
Stiglitz (1995) who elaborate on strategic delegation of retail pricing.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the incentives of manufacturers to use resale price maintenance
in the presence of common retailers who provide non-contractible services such as pre-sale
advice. By departing from the single manufacturer assumption predominantly used in the
literature on service and RPM, we identify a new rationale for why manufacturers want to
use minimum RPM: If retailers can marginally shift demand between competing products, a
manufacturer can induce retailers to oversell her product by reducing retailing competition
thereon.
Strong retailing competition implies that each manufacturer can proﬁtably increase retail
margins by introducing minimum RPM and thereby increase the sales of her product. This
is the case even if only simple linear tariﬀs can be used, i.e. providing retail margins is costly
for a manufacturer. If, instead, retailing competition is weak, manufacturers use maximum
RPM to reduce double marginalization.
We ﬁnd that minimum RPM always increases consumer prices. For demand linear in
prices, minimum RPM reduces manufacturers’ proﬁts, but beneﬁts retailers. Hence, the
possibility to use minimum RPM creates a prisoner’s dilemma for manufacturers. On the
contrary, maximum RPM unambiguously reduces consumer prices and increases manufac-
turer proﬁts to the detriment of retailers.
By holding the overall service level constant, we show that manufacturers’ competition
for retailer services yields minimum RPM and higher consumer prices without any consumer
beneﬁt. The detrimental eﬀect of minimum RPM on consumer surplus and manufacturer
rents is driven by manufacturers’ competition for non-contractible retailer services that in-
crease sales of one product by diverting sales away from the other product.
We thereby broaden the perspective of the service argument with a single manufacturer
according to which a manufacturer’s and consumers’ interests are generally aligned with
respect to retail margins. A manufacturer selling through common retailers does not inter-
nalize the interests of other manufacturers. If retailers have inﬂuence on consumers’ choices,
a manufacturer beneﬁts from biased advice to the detriment of competitors and consumers.
This sheds new light on the argument often voiced by manufacturers that minimum
RPM is necessary to maintain a high price level in order to avoid price erosion and, thereby,
23incentivize retailers to provide suﬃcient service.
For competition policy, it is crucial to discriminate between cases where free-riding among
retailers yields an insuﬃcient level of retailer services and cases in which overall service is not
at risk. The danger is that competition policy relies too much on the extensively modeled
free-riding argument with a single manufacturer as in Leegin and the new vertical guidelines of
the European Union. Thus, the circumstance that competing manufacturers sell through the
same retailers should be appropriately taken into account when evaluating service incentives
as an eﬃciency defense for resale price maintenance.
Recent empirical studies on pharmaceuticals (Brekke, Holmås & Straume, 2010) and
ﬁnancial services (Hackethal, Inderst & Meyer, 2010) indicate that retailers’ matching advice
is inﬂuenced by monetary incentives. RPM has been observed in markets for books, consumer
electronics, contact lenses, fashion clothing and hearing devices where consumer inﬂuence
through sales advice also seems plausible. We believe that the rationale for minimum RPM
identiﬁed in the present paper extends to cases where product positioning is important, such
as groceries. However, the results are derived under simplifying assumptions such as linear
tariﬀs, an exogenous overall level of service and no direct price competition among brands.
While we have shown that these assumptions can be relaxed, one has to keep in mind that
other eﬀects may overlay the competitive harm pointed out here. Further research along
these lines may be fruitful.
Also, there is little empirical evidence on RPM. A recent pathbreaking contribution is
Bonnet & Dubois (2010) who argue that RPM and two-part tariﬀs as modeled by Rey &
Vergé (2010) are prevalent in the market for bottled water in France. Interestingly, they
do not test against the scenario of minimum RPM and linear tariﬀs as investigated in the
present paper. More empirical research in this area seems promising.
24Appendix A: Omitted proofs.
Lemma 1.
Proof. The ﬁrst order condition of a retailer k for the price of product i is given by:
di,k(Pi) + (pi,k − wi)∂pi,kdi,k(Pi) = 0.
We procede by ﬁrst showing that a unique symmetric equilibrium for the retailers’ pricing
game exists. Recall that the assumptions (A2), (A3), (A4) imposed on di,k(Pi) imply that
the price reaction functions are contractions and thereby a unique and symmetric ﬁxed point
exists. Hence, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium for the subgame in which both






This condititon is independent of Mi and w−i. We now show that 0 < dwip∗
i < 1 holds, i.e.
the retail price increases in the wholesale price and retailers’ margins for a product i decrease
in wi. The derivative ∂wip∗
i can be calculated applying the implicit function theorem on the



























The numerator of the last expression consists of the own price derivative which is clearly
negative by (A2). Also, the denominator is negative. The ﬁrst two summands are negative by
(A2) which additionally implies that the own- dominates the cross price eﬀect in magnitude.
Assumption (A3) of a dominant diagonal of the Hessian of di,k implies that ∂2
pi,k,pi,kdi(p∗) +
∂2
pi,k,pi,−kdi(p∗) ≤ 0 and a negative margin is strictly dominated. Hence, 0 < dwip∗
i. Clearly,
dwip∗
i < 1 as the numerator is smaller than the denominator in magnitude.





Hence, the ratio in margins for a given p between monopoly and duopoly is given by
1 + ∂pi,−kdi,k(p)/∂pi,kdi,k(p) and therefore the latter summand can be interpreted as the in-
tensity of retailer competition. As competition increases, ∂pi,−kdi,k(p∗) → −∂pi,kdi,k(p∗),
p∗ − wi → 0 and dwip∗
i → 1.
25Lemma 2.
Proof. To determine the eﬀect of an increase in wi on the equilibrium service s∗ set by both
retailers, implicitly diﬀerentiate the FOC of a retailer’s problem with respect to sk as given













By symmetry of the products, mi,k(sk) = m−i,k(−sk). Substituting this into the retailer’s





























The term in the square bracket is the eﬀect of an increase in a wholesale price wi on retailer’s
per unit proﬁt from product i and is clearly negative as ∂wip∗
i < 1. The denominator is
negative as the per unit proﬁt of each product is positive and ∂2
(sk)2mi,k(sk) < 0 as well as
∂2
(sk)2mi,k(−sk) < 0 by (A6). Thus, sgn(ds∗
k
dwi) = sgn(−∂skmi,k(sk)). Hence, if ∂skmi,k(sk) > 0,
i.e. increasing sk increases the mass of product i, then increasing wi decreases sk. Mass is
shifted away from a product when its wholesale price increases.
Substituting into the implicit derivative ds∗
k
dwi the values of the symmetric equilibrium of
the complete game without RPM, (wN,pN,s1 = s2 = 0), yields expression (5).
Proposition 1.
















Recall that di,k(p) ≡ di,k(p,p). Evaluating this equation at symmetric prices and services
(wi = wN,p∗














The assumption of quasi-concavity of πi(wi) implies that the above condition characterizes







































Evaluating the retailer’s FOC (3) of the sub-game at the equilibrium values of the complete













































Retailers’ margins for a product i decrease in wi, i.e. 0 < dwip∗
i < 1 as shown in Lemma 1. To













































Hence, ∂λwN < 0.
Lemma 3.
Proof. Given that using the additional instrument of RPM is a dominant strategy for a








taking the prices of the other manufacturer as given. Recall that di,k(p) ≡ di,k(p,p) and that
Mi,k(S∗) = 2mi,k(s∗) by symmetry of the retailers service decisions in the subgame. The
FOCs for a manufacturer using RPM can be written as
∂wiπi = di(pi)mi,k(s
∗





∂piπi = wi (∂pidi(pi)mi,k(s
∗





We proceed by showing that there exists a linear combination of the above conditions that
equals the FOC for pricing under monopoly given by (2). Note that any linear combination
of the above FOCs must be zero at the point of the optimal price. If there exists a linear
combination of the above two FOCs that equals the FOC under monopoly, then the optimal
price for a manufacturer using RPM equals the monopoly price.
Under RPM of manufacturer i, the following derivatives can be derived from the FOC of





−∂skmi,k(sk) [dik(pi) + (pi − wi)∂pidik(pi)]







∂(sk)2mi,k(sk)(pi − wi)di,k(pi) + ∂(si)2mi,k(−sk)(p−i − w−i)d−i,k(p−i)
.
Substituting these into the two manufacturer’s FOCs above and using that ∂wiπi +k∂piπi =
0∀k, it can be shown that k = pi/wi implies pi ∂pi,kdi,k(pi) + di,k(pi) = 0 which is true iﬀ
pi = pM.
28Proposition 2.
Proof. Summing up the FOCs of a manufacturer’s maximization problem, imposing symme-










As pR = pM for any retailers’ potential to shift demand, λ, the wholesale price clearly
decreases in λ. For λ → ∞, wR → 0 and for λ → 0, wR → pM.
Lemma 4.
Proof. Note that due the single peakedness of the retailer’s proﬁt in pi,k (this follows from
demand assumption (A4)) the ﬁrst derivative is monotone in pi,k, hence if the ﬁrst derivative
of the proﬁt function wrt. to pi,k is positive at pi,k = pM, retailer k wants to increase (decrease)








Substituting wR = pM/(1 + λ) and pM = −
di,k(pM,pM)






















− 1 < λ.
Lemma 5.
Proof. For notational convenience subscript i is suppressed. Recall that di,k(p) ≡ di,k(p,p).
Deﬁne φ(p) ≡
dk(p)
−∂pdk(p) with p1 = p2 = p. Log-concavity of dk(p) implies that ∂pφ(p) ≤ 0.
Hence pN < pM implies that φ(pN) ≥ φ(pM). Note that pM = φ(pM).











∂p−kd(pN)∂wp∗(wN)(1 + λ) + ∂pkdk(pN)(∂wp(wN) + λ)




































∂pdk(pN) ≥ 1. This condition approaches λ > 0 as retailing com-
petition approaches Bertrand, i.e. ∂wp∗ → 1 and
−∂pkdk(pN)
∂p−kdk(pN) → 1. Similarly, as the RHS
is bounded for ∂p−kdk(p) > 0∀p ≥ 0, as λ grows without bounds, the condition holds for
suﬃciently high λ.
Proposition 3.
Proof. Recall that pR = pM is independent of λ, but ∂λpN > 0 as ∂λwN > 0 by Proposition
1 and ∂wip∗
i > 0 by Lemma 1. Let denote λM denote the λ that solves pM = pN(λM). Note
that it must be that
λM =
−∂pkdk(pN)
∂p−kdk(pN) by construction of condition (11). Furthermore, at pN = pM, the RHSs of
conditions (10) and (11) coincide. Hence, there is eﬀectively neither minimum nor maximum
RPM at pN = pM. This implies that wN = wR (see Lemma 4). Clearly, di,k(pN) = di,k(pM)
and hence, there is no dilemma as wRd(pR) = wNd(pN).
30Consider an increase of λM by . The RHS of the minimum RPM condition (12) is not a
function of λ and hence λM +  >, i.e. for all λ > λM, there is minimum RPM and for all
λ < λM, there is maximum RPM. The RHS of condition (11) is a function of λ. However,
pN is aﬀected by λ only through the wholesale price, in particular ∂wNpN > 0 by Lemma 1.
The wholesale price decreases monotonically in λ, i.e. ∂λwN < 0 by Proposition 1. Hence,
for all λ ? λM, it must be that pM ? pN.
In consequence, the conditions for minimum RPM and a price increase due to RPM are
equivalent.
Lemma 6.
Proof. Consider that the conditions for minimum RPM 10 and a price increase 11 they only
diﬀer by the price locus of the partial derivatives with respect to prices. However, as these
derivatives are constants under linearity they are independent of the price level and hence
both expressions are equivalent. For the comparison of the wholesale prices WLOG deﬁne
dik as a − bpik + cpi,−k with a = α
β+γ, b =
β
β2−γ2 and c =
γ
β2−γ2. Recall that by Lemma1,
the price p∗(w) is characterized by the FOC (3)of retailer’s proﬁt with respect to pk under
symmetry, i.e. p1 = p2. With linear demand, this corresponds to







Equilibrium prices for the symmetric cases with and without RPM can be easily obtained
by plugging the linear-demand analogs into the reduced form expressions (2), (7), (8), and
(9). Note that for the linear demand case, ∂p−kdi,k(pN
i ) = c, ∂wip∗
i = b
2b−c, ∂pi,kdi,k(pN
i ) = −b,
∂pidi(pN
i ) = 2(−(b−c)), dik(pN
i ) = a−(b−c) a+w b
2b−c . Let the subscript LIN denote equilibrium



































2(b − c)(1 + λ)
Note that wN
LIN = wR
LIN , i.e. the wholesale price does not depend on the regime (RPM or no
31RPM). Hence, the dilemma condition wNd(pN) > wRd(pM) reduces to d(pN) > d(pM) which
is true if and only if pN < pM as ∂pd(p) = − 1
β+γ < 0.
Appendix B: Micro foundation of service
In this extension, we motivate the assumptions imposed on reduced-form demand in equation
(1) by modeling retailers as matchmakers. After retail prices are set, assume that the game
proceeds as follows:
1. Consumers are not informed about the existence nor the match value of the two prod-
ucts and hence randomly visit a retailer.
2. Each retailer receives a signal for each consumer in his shop and matches one product
i ∈ {A,B} to each consumer.
3. Each consumer learns her valuation vi,k for the matched product i at both retailers k,
and learns the prices Pi for this product at both retailers
4. Each consumer decides to buy one unit of the matched product at one retailer or buy
nothing at all.
There is a mass Γ of consumers. A consumer is of type ω ∈ {A,B} with Pr(ω = A) = 0.5.
While the distribution is common knowledge, an individual consumer’s type and her valua-
tions are ex ante unknown to everybody. As consumers ex ante do not know their product
or retailer preferences we assume that they distribute symmetrically over both retailers.
Once a consumer seeks advice at a retailer, the retailer receives a private and noisy
signal σ about the consumer’s type that is distributed with the cdf F(σ) of the interval
[σ, ¯ σ]. With the information of the signal he updates his beliefs about the consumer type
q(σ) = Pr(ω = A|σ) = 1 − Pr(ω = B|σ). Both retailers receive the same signal for each
consumer, which is commonly known. Hence, both retailers have the same posterior belief
about any consumer’s type.38
A consumer with type ω c.p. prefers product i = ω over i 6= ω. Assume that a consumer
of type ω being matched with product i = ω draws her valuation vi,kfor each retailer from the
joint distribution H(vi,k,vi,−k). Instead, if the consumer is matched with product i 6= ω, she
draws a valuation of 0 with probability 1. This simpliﬁes the presentation of a consumer’s
inference as a mis-match simply has a value of 0 to the consumer.
38This simpliﬁes the analysis as a consumer correctly infers that retailers in the symmetric equilibrium
treat her equally, hence visiting the other retailer for another advice does not occur.
32What happens if a consumer realizes vi,k = 0? In reality, the consumer may ask for the
other product to be presented to her. In order for advice to be important, it must be that
in equilibrium not all consumers are completely informed about all products. Allowing for
a consumer to desire a second advice in some cases would complicate the model. Therefore,
we assume that no consumer considers a second match. This is reasonable if the net value of
a second demonstration is negative. Toward this goal, one may assume that the cost of time
per consumer advice is suﬃciently convex.39 Alternatively, one may assume that independent
of ω, there is a mass point of δ ≡ Pr(vi,k = 0) > 0. A consumer realizing vi,k = 0 for this ﬁrst
match correctly infers that either she does not like any of the products or that this match
was a mis-match, i.e. ω 6= i and v−i,k > 0. If retailers provide informative advice and δ is
not too small, the ﬁrst match has a higher expected match value than the second match.
Hence, even with linear costs of time, a consumer may rationally stop searching after a ﬁrst
unsuccessful advice.
For consumers to rationally seek advice, matching quality must be suﬃciently high in
equilibrium. If a retailer biases his advice, matching quality declines. For the following
exposition, assume that consumers believe that retailers’ advice is suﬃciently good and that
this belief is fulﬁlled in equilibrium, i.e. advice is indeed not too biased. We abstract form
modeling this belief explicitly.
A consumer buys at retailer k iﬀ vi,k − pi,k ≥ max(vi,−k − pi,−k,0). Integrating this








This demand formulation has the property that demand decreases when all prices increase,
with ∂pi,kdi,k < 0 and ∂pi,−kdi,k > 0 if h does not vanish. However, this discrete choice
demand foundation is generically inconsistent with globally linear price derivatives, for a more
detailed discussion see Jaﬀe and Weyl (2010). Our assumptions on higher order derivatives,
in particular, the negative dominant diagonal of the Hessian of di,k can be met by choosing
an appropriate distribution H.
The service choice of a retailer boils down to choosing a threshold probability sk, such
that for signals above sk, the retailer matches consumers with product A and for smaller
σ with product B. The mass of consumers who are correctly matched with product i, by









39For example, Ellison & Wolitzky (2009) use this assumption.
33The total mass of consumers relevant for product i consists of the sum of the consumers
correctly matched with i at each retailer, i.e. Mi = mi,k(sk) + mi,k(s−k).





If σ is uniformly distributed which implies f0(σ) = 0, the second derivatives of mA,k and
mB,k are negative on the support of σ and, hence, Mi is concave in S. For example, consider
Γ = 4/3, σ is uniformly distributed on the interval [−0.5, 0.5], and 1−q(σ) = (σ+0.5). This
yields mA,k = 4/6(1 − (−sk + 0.5)2), which meets our required properties.
Finally, demand for product i at retailer k as a function of prices Pi and service decisions
S is given by
Di,k(Pi,S) = di,k(Pi)Mi(S).
This corresponds to the reduced form of demand in equation (1).
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